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LEGISLATIVE POWERS
N. Y. CONST. art. III, § 9:
A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do busi-
ness. Each house shall determine the rules of its own proceed-
ings ....
N.Y CoNsT. art. IV, § 7:
Every bill which shall have passed the senate and assembly
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor; if he
approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his ob-
jections to the house in which it shall have originated, which
shall enter the objections at large on the journal, and proceed to
reconsider it.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he
shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider
it.
COURT OF APPEALS
King v. Cuomo 154 8
(decided May 6, 1993)
Appellants sought to reverse a judgment of the Appellate
Division, Third Department, which held that the bicameral
"recall" practice used by the legislature to reacquire bills already
given to the Governor was constitutional. 1549 The court of
1548. 81 N.Y.2d 247, 613 N.E.2d 950, 597 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1993).
1549. Seymour v. Cuomo, 180 A.D.2d 215, 584 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d Dep't
1992), rev'd, 81 N.Y.2d 247, 613 N.E.2d 950, 597 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1993).
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appeals held that the bicameral "recall" practice violated the New
York State Constitution article IV Section 7,1550 which
prescribes how a passed bill becomes a law. 155 1 The court held
the procedure to be unconstitutional, prospectively as of the date
of this court of appeals decision, May 6, 1993.1552
In June 1990, Assembly Bill Number 9592-A155 3 was passed
by both the Assembly and the Senate and was formally sent to the
Governor in the middle of July, 1990.1554 The day after the bill
was sent to the Governor, the Assembly, with the Senate
concurring, adopted a resolution requesting that the bill be sent
back to the Legislature. 1555 The Governor promptly returned the
bill as requested on that same day. 1556 Appellants argued that the
Legislature's method of retrieving the bill was unconstitutional,
and accordingly, that this passed bill became law because the
Governor failed to veto it within ten days of its receipt. 1557
The court initially addressed the state's contention that judicial
review of the bicameral recall process violated the principle of
1550. N.Y. CONST. art IV, § 7. This section provides:
Every bill which shall have passed the senate and assembly shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the governor; if he approve he shall
sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house in
which it shall have originated ... and proceed to reconsider it. If after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected to that house
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent together with the objections,
to the other house, by which it will be likewise reconsidered; and if
approved by two-thirds of the members elected to that house, it shall
become a law notwithstanding the objections of the governor . . . . If
any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall been presented to him, the same shall be a law in
like manner as if he had signed it ....
Id.
1551. King, 81 N.Y.2d at 250, 613 N.E.2d at 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
1552. Id. at 257, 613 N.E.2d at 955, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
1553. This bill was entitled "AN ACT to amend the agriculture and markets
law, in relation to the siting of solid waste management-resource recovery
facilities within agricultural districts." Id. at 250, 613 N.E.2d at 951, 597
N.Y.S.2d at 919.
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separation of powers between governmental branches. 1558 The
state maintained that the Assembly and Senate had its own
internal rules, and judicial review of such proceedings constituted
an intrusion into the internal affairs of the Legislature. 1559
Although the New York State Constitution states that "'[e]ach
house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings,'" 15 60 the
court held that this bicameral recall process did not involve only
internal affairs of the Legislature, but rather extended beyond the
Legislature's own proceedings, affecting executive proceedings,
and accordingly, was not justified by the Legislature's internal
rulemaking powers. 156 1 "'When both houses have... finally
passed a bill and sent it to the governor, they have exhausted
their powers upon it.'"1562 The court held that the Legislature
could not add an "expedient and unchartered bypass" without
guidance from the Constitution. 1563 The court went on to state
that "[w]hen language of a constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, full effect should be given to 'the intention of the
framers ... as indicated by the language employed' and
approved by the People." 1564 The court rejected the argument
that the recall process should be maintained simply because it
was "long-standing," and held that the practice was clearly
outside the plain language of the Constitution. 1565 Additionally,
the court concluded that the recall practice effected an imbalance
1558. Id. at 251, 613 N.E.2d at 951-52, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 919-20.
1559. Id. at 251, 613 N.E.2d at 952, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
1560. Id. (quoting N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 9).
1561. Id.
1562. Id. at 252, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (quoting People
v. Devlin, 33 N.Y. 269, 277 (1865)).
1563. Id. at 252, 613 N.E.2d at 952, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
1564. Id. at 253, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (quoting Settle v.
Van Evrea, 49 N.Y. 280, 281 (1872)). Based on the language of the section,
the court found that a passed bill may become law or be rejected by three
different methods. First, the Governor may approve the bill and sign it into
law. Second, the Governor may veto the bill and thus reject it. Third, the
Governor may approve the bill by not returning it to the Legislature within ten
days. Id. at 252, 613 N.E.2d at 952-53, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21.
1565. Id. at 254, 613 N.E.2d at 953, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
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in governmental power. 1566 The court stated that "[s]ince only
'insiders' are likely to know or be able to discover the private
arrangements between the Legislature and Executive when the
recall method is employed, open government would suffer a
significant setback if the courts were to countenance this long-
standing practice." 1567
Certain states do allow a recall practice to go on unabated. In
fact, as of 1981, there were some thirty-three states that actively
employed a recall practice of this nature. 1568 For instance, the
states of Florida, 1569 Marylandl 570 and Michigan1571 have ruled
that a recall practice is valid so long as it is done by a concurrent
action of both houses of the legislature, as opposed to the
independent action of one house. In contrast, Virginia has ruled
that the legislature has no such authority whatsoever. 1572 In New
York, between the years of 1932 and 1980, a bill was recalled by
1566. Id. at 255, 613 N.E.2d at 954, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 922. The court stated:
[T]he recall practice 'affords interest groups another opportunity to
amend or kill certain bills,' shielded from the public scrutiny which
accompanies the initial consideration and passage of a bill. This 'does
not promote public confidence in the legislature as an institution'
because 'it is difficult for citizens to determine the location in the
legislative process of a bill that may be of great importance to them.'
Id. (quoting JOSEPH H. ZIMMERMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF
NEW YORK STATE 145, 152 (1981)).
1567. Id.
1568. Gerald Benjamin, The Difffision of the Governor's Veto Power, 55
STATE GOV'T 99, 104 (1982).
1569. See, e.g., State ex rel. Florida Portland Cement Co. v. Hale, 176 So.
577 (Fla. 1937) (holding that neither house of the legislature can independently
recall a bill which has been presented to the governor).
1570. See, e.g., Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co. v. Canton Lumber Co.,
84 A. 188 (Md. 1912) (holding that the legislature may recall a bill presented
to the governor upon concurrent action of both houses).
1571. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atwood, 262 N.W. 922 (Mich. 1935) (holding
that concurrent action to recall a bill is acceptable).
1572. Wolfe v. McCaull, 76 Va. 876 (1882) (finding that the recall of a bill
is not a valid procedure).
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the New York Legislature 2,132 times, 1573 including 288 times
in 1966 alone. 1574
The King court concluded with a very strong statement on this
long-standing recall practice. 1575 The court stated:
In sum, the [recall] practice undermines the integrity of the law-
making process as well as the underlying rationale for the
demarcation of authority and power in this process. Requiring
that the Legislature adhere to this constitutional mandate is not
some hypertechnical insistence of form over substance, but
rather ensures that the central law-making function remains
reliable, consistent and exposed to civic scrutiny and
involvement. 1576
Thus, the court declared this bicameral recall process
unconstitutional. 15 7 7
The New York State Constitution1 57 8 very closely follows the
counterpart provision of the United States Constitution 1579 on
how a bill becomes a law. The United States Constitution
similarly does not provide for a legislative recall. Congress,
.however, may recall a bill with a concurrent resolution
appropriately endorsed by both houses. 15 80 During the time after
both houses of Congress pass a bill and before the President signs
it, Congress may recall the bill by passing a concurrent resolution
requesting that the President return the bill. 15 81 To date, the
constitutionality of a congressional recall has not been litigated in
the federal courts.
1573. See JOSEPH H. ZmMERMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF
NEW YORK STATE 145, 151 (1981).
1574. Id.
1575. King, 81 N.Y.2d at 255, 613 N.E.2d at 954, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
1576. Id.
1577. Id.
1578. N.Y. CONST. art IV, § 7.
1579. U.S. CONST. art II, § 7, cl. 2.
1580. See generally FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK'S
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